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We show that immigrant managers are substantially more likely to hire immigrants than are 
native managers. The finding holds when comparing establishments in the same 5-digit 
industry and location, when comparing different establishments within the same firm, when 
analyzing establishments that change management over time, and when accounting for 
within-establishment trends in recruitment patterns. The effects are largest for small and 
owner-managed establishments in the for-profit sector. Separations are more frequent when 
workers and managers have dissimilar origin, but only before workers become protected by 
EPL. We also find that native managers are unbiased in their recruitments of former co-
workers, suggesting that information deficiencies are important. We find no effects on entry 
wages. Our findings suggest that a low frequency of immigrant managers may contribute to 
the observed disadvantages of immigrant workers. 
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1  Introduction 
Managers are key players in the labor market. At the micro-level, managers make hiring 
decisions and determine wages, processes that are central to individual workers. In the 
aggregate, managerial behavior affects the wage distribution within and across 
establishments, and the allocation of skill across industries. Despite the central decision-
making role of managers, little attention has been given to the importance of managers 
for individual labor market outcomes. In this paper we study a particular form of 
manager influence: Do immigrant managers hire more immigrant workers? 
Non-western immigrants perform poorly at the labor market in most OECD 
countries. Sweden, from where we take our data, is no exception. An aspect of this 
which is largely overlooked in the previous literature is that the same groups of 
immigrants are also severely underrepresented in managerial positions.
5 While supply 
side factors, such as human capital and economic incentives, have been studied 
extensively in the past as potential explanations for the poor performance of immigrants 
in western countries, the discussion about the demand side has almost exclusively 
focused on the role of discrimination.
6 Recent studies document strong patterns of 
ethnic segregation across workplaces in the US (Hellerstein and Neumark, 2008), 
Sweden (Åslund and Skans, 2009) and Germany (Dustmann et al., 2009), suggesting 
that there are important differences in hiring patterns between observationally 
equivalent firms. The analysis in this paper shows that manager characteristics are an 
important explanation to why certain firms hire minority workers from disadvantaged 
groups, while others do not.    
Due to the non-random sorting of managers across firms it is generally difficult to 
distinguish the causal impact of manager characteristics from spurious relationships 
generated by unobservable characteristics. Studies relying on cross-sectional data have 
                                                 
5 We show that although 7.2 percent of the recently hired employees in our data are of immigrant origin, only 3.7 
percent of the managers belong to this group. 
6 Field experiments point at substantial ethnic discrimination in the hiring procedure against African-Americans in the 
US (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004) and workers of Middle-Eastern descent in Sweden (Carlsson and Rooth, 
2007). In addition, laboratory experiments suggest that people tend to favor/trust others with a similar ethnic 
background (e.g. Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001 and Ahmed, 2007). For quasi-experimental evidence of discrimination 




documented correlations between manager race and the race of hires (Carrington and 
Troske 1998; Stoll et al. 2004). To facilitate more reliable identification, a number of 
recent papers have relied on single firm data from high turnover firms. Bandiera et al. 
(2009) study the importance of social connections between the manager and employees 
for the allocation of jobs within a British fruit-picking farm where workers are allocated 
to jobs on a day by day basis. Two papers by Giuliano et al. (forthcoming, 2009) study 
ethnic biases in hiring and firing in a large US retail chain.  
These recent studies all provide compelling evidence of a causal effect of manager 
race/ethnicity on hiring patterns in the studied firms. The advantage of the data sets they 
use is the detailed longitudinal information on workers and managers, and in the case of 
Bandiera et al. (2009) also observable worker productivity.
7 However, it is an open 
issue whether the results can be generalized to a wider set of jobs, where jobs may be 
rationed and turnover low.  
Our study adds to this literature by analyzing longitudinal data on more than 100,000 
Swedish workplaces across the entire economy during a nine-year period, and with co-
worker information going even further back in time. The data allow us to implement 
various strategies to account for unobserved heterogeneity among workers, managers 
and firms, and to investigate different potential mechanisms. Furthermore we study a 
labor market where the recruitment decisions are likely to be crucial for both workers 
and firms due to high unemployment among minority workers and relatively stringent 
employment protection legislation.  
Our analysis reveals the following facts about manager origin and recruitment 
patterns: 
(1)  Immigrants are severely underrepresented among managers. Although 7.2 
percent of the hires in our data are non-western migrants, only 3.7 percent of the 
managers come from this group.  
                                                 
7 A closely related literature studies managers from a gender perspective and shows a positive correlation between 
female management and female wages (Carrington and Troske 1995; Hultin and Szulkin 2003). Using a matched 
employer-employee dataset for Portugal, Carduso and Winter-Ebmer (2007) estimate the effect of within-




(2)  The hiring patterns of immigrant managers and native managers are very 
different: Immigrant managers recruit 43 percent immigrant workers whereas the 
corresponding number for other managers is 6 percent. 
(3)  Even very similar (5-digit industry) establishments in the same localities differ 
systematically in their recruitment patterns depending on the origin of the 
manager. This pattern holds also when we compare different establishments 
within the same firm or follow the same establishments over time, even after 
accounting for establishment level trends. The estimates are robust and both 
economically and statistically significant throughout. 
(4)  The effect is present in workplaces of different sizes, in both the private and 
public sector, and in most industries. But the evidence also suggests that 
manager origin has a larger impact when the manager has a bigger stake in 
profits and when uncertainty should be more of a concern, i.e. in small and 
owner-managed companies and in the for-profit sector. 
(5)  Separations are more frequent when workers and managers are of dissimilar 
origin. This effect is entirely driven by workers who are unprotected by 
employment protection legislation. 
(6)  There is no evidence of an impact on entry wages from sharing origin with the 
manager. Productivity gains can therefore not be the sole underlying mechanism 
unless starting wages are independent of match-specific productivity. 
(7)  Manager-worker similarity matters also when managers hire former co-workers, 
but this effect is completely driven by immigrant managers. The absence of an 
effect among native managers could indicate that information asymmetries 
(which are substantially reduced in the former co-worker setting) are an 
important explanation for the baseline results. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the 
theoretical arguments on the importance of manager origin for hiring patterns and the 
institutional background. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 provides some 
descriptive patterns and sample statistics. Section 5 presents the results on the impact of 




conjunction with the empirical results. Section 6 analyzes the role of origin when 
managers hire former co-workers. Section 7 concludes. 
2  Background 
2.1  Why could manager origin matter? 
al and the workplace. The behavior of 
background as their manager may become more 
pro
rise due to preferences  among the agents. In 
Be
ies. Theories of statistical 
dis
A hiring constitutes a match between the individu
both parts, as well as the total surplus from a realized match, may therefore matter for 
who gets hired. Below we briefly discuss different explanations for why ethnic 
similarity between workers and managers may be important for recruitment patterns. In 
the presentation of the empirical results and in the conclusions we try to link the 
findings to the respective hypotheses. 
First, workers who have a similar 
ductive. A common language or business culture can e.g. lower transaction and 
communication costs (Lazear 1999; den Butter et al., 2004). A case where this 
mechanism should be particularly relevant is enterprises providing specific “ethnic” 
goods and services (e.g. restaurants).
8 
Second, systematic sorting can a
cker’s (1957) discrimination model, some—but not all—employers are unwilling to 
hire minority workers at the majority wage simply because they derive disutility from 
doing so. Group-biased preferences among majority and/or minority managers would 
lead to a relationship between manager origin and workforce composition. It should be 
noted that preferences can be important on both sides of the recruitment decision, i.e. 
not only among managers but also among (potential) applicants. In fact, Giuliano et al. 
(forthcoming) argue that worker preferences are the key factor for why black managers 
recruit less white applicants in the retail firm they study. 
A third explanation is informational asymmetr
crimination often assume that managers find it more difficult to value merits and 




therefore prefer to hire workers who are similar to themselves if acquiring information 
is costly. Conversely, it is conceivable that workers have difficulties valuing managers 
with a background that differs from their own.  
Fourth, networks could be important if they provide information on the availability 
an
teworthy that most of this previous literature focuses on the effects of social 
co
                                                                                                                                              
d quality of workers and/or vacancies (see e.g. Montgomery, 1991; Calvo-Armengol 
and Jackson, 2004 and Granovetter 1973).  There is a large and growing empirical 
literature suggesting that social networks are very important when workers get hired; 
Ioannides and Loury (2004) provide a survey. Individuals who live in the same 
residential area are more likely to work together (Bayer et al., 2008), parents help their 
children to find their first job (Kramarz and Skans, 2007), former co-workers share 
information about new jobs (Cingano and Rosalia, 2008), and immigrants with larger 
exogenous networks are more successful in the labor market (Munshi, 2003). A series 
of recent papers provide indirect evidence that ethnic labor market networks are 
important for black and Hispanic workers in the US (Hellerstein and Neumark 2008; 
Hellerstein et al. 2008a, 2008b and 2009) and for immigrants in Germany (Dustmann et 
al, 2009) 
It is no
ntacts among employees, and not on the manager specifically. Managers are expected 
to use social contacts if they have higher utility of employing workers whom they know, 
or if informal hiring methods imply lower recruitment costs. In the hiring process, 
networks formed at professional arenas can be of particular importance. Managers may 
hire individuals of their own origin simply because they have met more people sharing 
their own background, e.g. at previous workplaces. Moreover, there is a distinction in 
the literature between baseline homophily which means that networks of similar 
individuals arise because of the demographics of the available network pool, and 
inbreeding bias,  which is the excess effect of similarity arising because individuals 
associate more with similar people given their available network (see e.g. Currarini et 
al., 2008 and McPherson et al., 2001 for studies on homophily). We return to this 
 
8 In terms of our empirical model, preferences that affect productivity (such as customer preferences or preferences 




distinction when discussing informal hiring patterns in recruitments of former co-
workers in Section 6. 
2.2  Immigrants at the Swedish labor market 
Since 1960, the number of first-generation immigrants living in Sweden has grown from 
300,000 to more than one million. Today, the foreign-born constitute about 13 percent 
of Sweden’s nine million residents and define most of the country’s diversity in terms 
of origin or ethnicity. 
As in many other western countries the labor market position of the immigrant 
population has deteriorated during the last thirty years. In the 1950s and 1960s, labor 
migration from the Nordic countries (especially Finland) and continental Europe 
dominated the inflow. Immigration then gradually shifted toward refugees and family 
reunification migrants, many times from developing and geographically distant 
countries (e.g. Chile in the 1970s, Iran from the 1980s, Somalia and former Yugoslavia 
in the early 1990s, and Iraq in the 1990s and 2000s.) 
Even though natives on average perform better in the labor market than almost all 
groups of migrants, the great divider seems to be between those of western and non-
western origin. In 2002 (in the midst of our observation period, see below), the 
employment rate among natives was 76.8 percent. The corresponding figure for 
EU/EES migrants was 69.3 percent, compared to 53.5 percent among those born outside 
Europe. Wage differences are smaller, but follow the same pattern: the average monthly 
(full-time) wage among natives was SEK 22,250 in 2002; for immigrants from non-
European countries it was SEK 19,050, while EU migrants had an average wage almost 
identical to the one received by natives.
9 For a further discussion of these differences 
and their possible causes, see e.g. Eriksson (2007). 
                                                 
9 Figures for employment and unemployment come from the Swedish labor force surveys. Wages are calculated from 





3  Data 
Our primary source of data is a Swedish linked employer-employee database (RAMS) 
covering the period 1985 to 2005. We can derive information about each 
establishment’s manager for all workplaces in the public sector as well as for a large 
sample of private firms. The main sample consists of managers and employees in 
workplaces with less than 50 employees in the years 1997 to 2005. The rational for 
restricting the analysis to small and medium sized establishments is that it is more likely 
that the manager is directly involved in the hiring and firing decisions in such 
establishments.
10 Further, the data allow us to track managers, employees and 
establishments over time and link each of these subjects to detailed information on 
individual demographic characteristics (gender, age, region of birth, education and place 
of residence) as well as to basic information about each establishment (location, 
industry and sector). Our main working data set includes all newly recruited workers in 
establishments with less than 50 employees during the period 1997 to 2005 together 
with information on the immigration status of each worker and manager.  
 
Managers and wages 
We use a register (Strukturlönestatistiken) containing occupation and wages for a large 
sample of firms to identify managers. Borrowing from Carduso and Winter-Ebmer 
(2007) we use the following hierarchical criteria: (1) Owner of the firm; (2) Top 
manager; (3) Middle manager; (4) Highest wage. In case there are multiple observations 
fulfilling the same criterion we use lower ranked criteria to identify the manager (e.g. 
the middle manager with the highest wage).
11 This strategy is likely to introduce some 
                                                 
10 Since previous research shows that segregation is most prevalent among small to medium sized establishments (see 
e.g. Åslund and Skans, 2009) our results are not necessarily representative for larger establishments. However, given 
that the data show that the median worker is employed in an establishment with 52 employees (2001), we cover a 
substantial part of the workforce. 
11 To increase sample size (particularly in the establishment fixed effect estimations), we use also information from 
population-wide data on estimated monthly wages (see for example Skans, Edin and Holmlund, 2009 for procedures). 
If an establishment is sampled at two separate points in time with the same manager, the same person is assumed to 
be manager also in the years in between (provided he/she is at the establishment). If the sample data identifies a 
manager in one year, the same person is assumed to be manager in all continuously preceding and following years in 




measurement error in the manager code and robustness checks to address this concern is 
discussed in the empirical section. 
The raw occupational data is structured according to the Swedish Standard for 
Classification of Occupations (SSYK), which is based on international standards 
(ISCO-88). The first digit in the occupational code divides the data into ten major 
occupational levels based on the skill requirements and with a specific number for 
managerial positions. Using additional digits, we can also distinguish between top and 
middle managers. In addition to occupational information, we use information on 
ownership which is available for all establishments. 
The data on occupations and wages cover all establishments in the public sector but 
are sampled at the firm level for the private sector. The sampling probabilities depend 
on firm size which implies that we will have an under-representation of establishments 
belonging to smaller private firms in our full sample. We therefore also present results 
separately for each firm size bracket (i.e. each stratum). Although the sampling 
probabilities are small for small firms, many large firms have small establishments, and 
thus our final dataset covers approximately 30 percent of all small and medium sized 
private establishments (Table A2, Appendix).  
 
Origin classification 
The main analysis aggregates the individuals by their country of birth into two 
categories: (i) workers of Western origin i.e. natives and immigrants from Western 
countries; (ii) immigrant workers of Non-Western origin. For convenience, we label the 
groups “Natives” and “Immigrants”. This division is consistent with the main divider in 
terms of differences in labor market outcomes, and also with the public perception of 
“being foreign” (see e.g. Mella and Palm, 2009). We also present robustness checks 
using four groups (“Native”, “Western”, “Eastern Europe”, and “Non-Europe”).
12 In 
addition, where the specification allows for it, we utilize more detailed information on 
the individual’s country of origin and investigate the differential impact of immigrant 
                                                 




managers on the hiring probabilities for own-country versus other-country workers (see 
Table A1 in Appendix A for a list of countries). 
 
Data on hired workers  
We create data on new hires for the years where we have information on managers, i.e. 
1997–2005. A new hire is a worker who received remuneration from the establishment 
in a given year, but not during any of the preceding five years. We disregard individuals 
earning below the 10
th percentile of the overall annual earnings distribution in order to 
avoid classifying very loosely connected (i.e. working a few hours within the year) 
workers as new hires. We are primarily interested in recruitments within continuing 
plants and therefore require that the establishment existed in the preceding year. For the 
same reason we also classify an establishment as new (and remove it) if more than 2/3 
of the workforce changed (in either direction) from one year to the next.
13  
 
Data on recruitments of former colleagues 
The long panel of individuals and establishments allows us to create a unique dataset 
containing all cases where newly hired worked with their hiring manager sometime in 
the past. In practice we follow each hired worker and his/her manager from the year of 
the hire and back to the start of our data (1985) and if they are found in the same 
workplace anytime during this period, we take the last year this happens and add all 
other co-workers from that establishment and year to the data. 
To minimize the risk of simultaneity and/or reverse causality we include only cases 
where the manager worked at the new establishment the year before the hire. We also 
restrict the analysis to individuals that worked together in an establishment with less 
than 100 employees. The reason is that we want it to be likely that the two agents 
interacted at the old workplace so that they were able to eliminate uncertainty about 
each other’s productivity. We do not however put any restriction on the manager’s 
occupational level at the past workplace. Thus he or she did not have to be a manager at 




compensation from the same establishment during the same year at some point from 
1985 and up to the new hiring. 
4  Descriptive patterns: Migrant status among managers 
and the newly-hired 
Before proceeding with the more formal analysis we show some key descriptive 
statistics from our sample. Figure 1 presents the share of immigrant hires and managers, 
overall and by industry. Two important facts are visible in the figure: First, the top bars 
show that immigrants are underrepresented among managers in relation to their share of 
hires. Whereas 7 percent of the hired workers are immigrants the corresponding number 
for managers is only 3 percent.
14 Second, there is systematic sorting across industries 
both among hired workers and managers; the representation of immigrants is much 
higher in “hotels and restaurants” and “transportation” than in other industries. Overall 
industries with few immigrant managers also hire a lower than average share of 
immigrant workers. 
                                                                                                                                               
13 When checking that new hires did not receive earnings from the same establishment in the past we use the original 
workplace identification number in order to make sure that the hires were really externally recruited. 
14 Official statistics from the 2007 labor force surveys confirm this picture for the overall population of employees: 6 
percent of all native employees are managers whereas the figure is less than 2 percent for immigrants from non-








Health and social work
Education
Public adm. and defence




Wholesale and retail sale
Construction








Figure 1 Share of Immigrant managers and hires in different industries 
 
Table 1 presents further statistics. These clearly show that the sectoral sorting displayed 
in the above figure also carries down to the establishment level. A substantially higher 
share of immigrants works for immigrant managers. This holds also for the newly hired 
and the differences are enormous: the share of immigrants hired under immigrant 
management is 43 percent, compared to 6 percent in other establishments. Thus, 
immigrant managers hire immigrant workers with a 7 times higher probability than 
other managers. About half of the immigrant workers that are hired by immigrant 
managers are from other countries than the manager (not in table). In other words, 
hiring countrymen is common, but it is also the case that immigrants hire other foreign-
born workers to a much larger extent than do native managers. We also see that 
immigrant managers manage smaller establishments, hire fewer individuals and operate 





Table 1 Sample Statistics 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Manager origin:  ALL  Native  Immigrant 
      
Establishment characteristics:       
Immigrant hires  0.07  0.06  0.43 
Immigrant share
  0.05 0.04 0.43 
Establishment size  24.3  24.5  17.9 








Immigrant share in mun. and 5-digit industry  0.06  0.05 
 
0.20 
Manager type:       
Owner 0.09  0.07  0.51 
Top Manager  0.14  0.14  0.08 
Middle Manager  0.24  0.24  0.07 
Highest wage  0.53  0.54  0.33 
      
Manager origin     
Native (treated as “natives”)  0.94  0.96  - 
Western countries (treated as “natives”)  0.04  0.04  - 
      
Eastern Europe (treated as “immigrants”) 0.01 -  0.40 
Other (treated as “immigrants”)  0.02  -  0.60 
      
Observations
(1)  843,085 818,752  24,333 
Notes: 
(1) The level of observation is the individual. The sample consists of all establishments that hired at least one 
individual during the period 1997–2005. The classification of “native” and “immigrant” managers is motivated in section 
2. 
 
Turning to the manager characteristics we see that a much larger fraction of the 
immigrant managers are owners (51 percent vs. 7 percent of native managers), which is 
in line with self-employment being comparatively prevalent in this group. A large share 
of both the native and the immigrant managers are identified by their wage. This is a 
potential concern since measurement error is likely to be prevalent in this group of 
managers. To deal with this we also present results for the impact of manager origin 
separately by manager classification in the analysis below. 
5  Empirical analysis 
5.1  Hiring patterns 
We estimate the effect of manager origin on the origin of new hires using linear 









ijt X M H ε β γ + + =      (1) 
 
where H is an indicator for whether the hired individual i in establishment j in year t 
was immigrant (im); M is a dummy variable for immigrant manager; X is a vector of 
control variables and ε is the error term. Our aim is to identify the causal impact of 
manager origin on the probability that new hires are immigrants. In order to do so we 
need to remove potential confounding factors. We therefore exploit a number of 
alternative identification strategies, all implemented as variation of controls in the X-
vector of equation (1). These are described below together with the results. 
5.1.1  Baseline results 
Table 2 presents results from estimation of equation (1).
15 The dependent variable is the 
probability that a hired worker is of immigrant origin and the covariate of interest is a 
dummy for whether the manager is immigrant. All specifications include year dummies 
to account for national trends in recruitment patterns and workplace size dummies in 10 
employee intervals. Other controls vary between columns. 
The estimate of 0.369 in column 1 confirms the substantial raw correlation between 
manager origin and the origin of new hires shown in the previous section. In column (2) 
we remove the impact of regional sorting by introducing 289 municipality dummies. 
This only marginally reduces the estimate. We have also verified that the result holds if 
we replace municipality indicators by neighbourhood indicators. Thus, regional sorting 
is not driving the raw correlation. 
In column 3 we compare similar firms in the same regions by including dummies 
(fixed effects) for each combination of year, municipality and industry (at the 5-digit 
level). Most of the estimated effect remains—the estimate is 0.244. It is noteworthy that 
the 5-digit industry codes are quite detailed. The specification implies that we, for 
example, compare hiring patterns between different pharmacies (code 52310) or taxi 
businesses (60220) located in the same area (the average municipality has 30,000 
                                                 





residents). Thus, manager origin is highly correlated with the origin of new hires even 
when establishments are both similar and located nearby. 
In order to account for remaining unobservable confounders, column 4 includes the 
share of immigrants among the other employees (excluding the manager and new hires) 
at the establishment as a covariate. This substantially reduces the coefficient, but the 
estimate is still large (0.123) and highly significant.
16 Hence, even when we compare 
two firms in the same industry, year and geographic area, and also take into account the 
demographic composition of the current workers, the probability that the newly hired is 
an immigrant is nearly three times as high if the manager is also of immigrant origin 
(the overall share of immigrant hires is 7 percent).
17  Using finer neighborhood 
indicators does not alter any of the results.
18  
When interpreting these results it is important to note that they do not imply perfect, 
or even increasing, segregation over time. The reason is that the job durations are finite, 
and the sorting less than perfect. Thus, even if firms with an immigrant manager and a 
high share of immigrant workers tend to hire more immigrants, they will not necessarily 
end up having a homogenous workforce since some workers will leave, and some of the 
workers who replace those who leave will be natives.  
  Finally in column 5 we allow the estimates to vary depending on the type of 
manager. The effect is substantially larger in owner-managed establishments than in 
establishments with other types of management, an issue we will return to below. 
Importantly, however we find large and significant effects for all types of managers; 5 
percentage points implies close to a doubling of the probability. 
                                                 
16 We have also verified that the origin of the manager is significantly more important than the origin of other 
workers by re-estimating the model with the manager included in the share of incumbent immigrant workers.  
17 Interestingly, our estimated effect from the share of immigrant co-workers is not far off from what Dustmann et al. 
(2009) found for Germany in a similar specification. 
18 When replacing municipalities with neighborhood indicators (“SAMS”) which on average contain a population 






Table 2 OLS estimates of manager origin on origin of new hires 
  Dependent variable: Pr(Hire is Immigrant) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Immigrant manager  0.369*** 0.332*** 0.244*** 0.123***   
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)   
Owner       0.260*** 
       (0.009) 
Top manager       0.059*** 
       (0.015) 
Middle manager       0.036** 
       (0.016) 
Highest wage       0.052*** 
       (0.007) 
       
Share immigrants at 
establishment 




       
Firm size dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mun-Year dummies  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mun-Ind-Year dummies  No No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  843,085 843,085 843,085 843,085 843,085 
R
2  0.059 0.087 0.251 0.272 0.274 
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. *,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10/5/1 
percent level respectively. Standard errors robust for serial correlation at the establishment level are 
shown in parentheses. The estimated model is a linear probability model where the dependent variable 
indicates whether the new hire was native (0) or immigrant (1). The omitted category on manager origin is 
native. Industry codes are at the 5-digit establishment level. The sample consists of establishments with 
less than 50 employees and all regressions include controls for establishment size of ten employee 
intervals. The share of immigrants is the share when the manager is excluded, hence all specifications 
require that the establishment had at least one employee apart from the manager.  
 
5.1.2  Comparisons within firms and establishments 
Even though the specifications presented above are quite rich, one could still worry 
about remaining unobserved characteristics that are correlated with the origin of the 
manager. To verify the robustness of our results we perform a series of specification 
tests addressing concerns about endogenous workplace selection of managers, common 
shocks, and trends in hiring patterns. 
In order to remove (potentially year specific) unobserved heterogeneity at the firm 
level we use data from firms with multiple establishments in the same location. To 
handle unobserved factors at the establishment level, we use data on establishments 




period. As shown in Table A3 both of these criteria basically exclude all owner-
managed establishments.
19. To evaluate the importance of unobserved heterogeneity, 
we should therefore compare the estimates from the firm/establishment fixed effects 
models to a baseline specification excluding owners; this is done below. For 
comparison, columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 present the baseline estimates both with and 
without owners. As already indicated in Table 2, the average effect is smaller without 
owners (but still large and significant). 
                                                
 
Firm fixed effects 
We first analyze within-firm variations. We include dummies for the combination of 
year, firm, municipality, and industry of the establishment.
  The idea is to compare 
establishments with the same firm-specific culture, involved in a similar production 
process and located in the same local labor market.
 Given the year interaction, this 
specification also handles unobserved time effects at the firm level (e.g. changes in a 
firm’s human resource policies). We only include firms in the private sector. As shown 
by Table A3 the establishments which fulfill these criteria are often found in consumer 
services, e.g. retailers and banks. The results, presented in column (3) of Table 3 show 
an estimate (0.044) very similar and not statistically different from the main model 
without owners (0.051). 
 
Establishment fixed effects 
Including establishment dummies in equation (1) means that we remove all fixed 
workplace characteristics. The specification is identified from the cases where manager 
origin changes over time within the establishment. Due to the large degree of 
segregation and the low frequency of immigrant managers, changes in manager origin 
are fairly unusual. In addition, the management data are based on random yearly (firm-
based) samples, and the specification relies on someone actually being recruited in the 
sampled year. Since we need two such observations for each establishment, and a 
change of manager origin in-between, we end up with a relatively small dataset for this 
 
19 Due to the organization of multi-establishment firms we are not particularly surprised finding no owner defined 
workplaces in this category. Furthermore there are very few changes in origin ownership (they account for 2 percent 
of the cases, see column (3)) which may be partly explained by more persistence in this category and more informal 









                                                
specification.
20 However, column (4) shows that the establishment fixed effects 
estimate (0.045) is very much in line with the baseline est
 
Establishment level trends 
An additional concern is workplace-specific trends in hiring patterns, which may 
generate a spurious relationship between the origin of the manager and the origin of 
newly hired workers. Establishments with an increasing share of immigrant hires may 
more often end up having immigrant managers, and increases in immigrant hires may 
lead to a change in manager origin. Both of these mechanisms would introduce an 
upward bias to our estimates.   
As an additional robustness check we therefore estimated models including linear 
trends (centered on the year of the manager change for the interval [–6, 6]) for 
establishments changing manager. This sample differs from the establishment fixed 
effects sample in that it does not require hires both before and after the manager change 
in the same establishment. In column (5) the trend is allowed to differ depending on the 
direction of the manager change and in column (6) we also let the slope differ before-
after the change (by direction, thus 4 slopes). The estimates in these columns are, again, 





20 To reduce the risk of having false transitions exacerbating potential measurement error bias we restrict our sample 
to establishments that change manager origin only once during the period and we also require that each manager is 
observed more than one year. Estimating the effect without these restrictions produces a somewhat smaller estimate, 
this is however not significantly different from the fixed effects estimate reported in the table. 
21 Allowing the estimate in column (4) to vary by manager type we found a positive and significant effect (6.8 
percentage points) for “Top managers” (the most reliable criteria). For Middle managers [Highest wage] the estimates 
were 0.046 (0.026) [0.030 (0.017)].  
 
Table 3 Robustness results 
  Dependent variable: Pr(Hire is immigrant) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












        
Immigrant manager  0.123*** 0.051*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.051*** 0.056*** 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.020) 
        
Firm  size    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mun-Ind-Year    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Immigrant share
A Yes Yes Yes  Yes
A Yes  Yes 
Firm-Mun-Ind-Year  -  - Yes -  -  - 
Establishment  - - -  Yes  - - 
2  trends  - - - -  Yes  Yes 
4  trends  - - - - -  Yes 
Observations  843,085 766,983 155,085  5,504  7,706  7,706 
R
2  0.272 0.195 0.111 0.241 0.075 0.076 
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. *,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10/5/1 percent level respectively. Standard errors robust for serial correlation at 
the establishment level are shown in parentheses. The firm fixed effects sample (column (3)) is restricted to multiple private firms. The establishment fixed effects sample (column (4)) 
includes establishments that changed manager origin once during the period. All regressions include dummies for establishment size of ten employee intervals. The trends control for 
the distance to change (-6 – 6) and we allow the trends to vary with respect to the direction of the change in the 2-trend case (column (5)), and also before and after the manager 
change in the (pooled) 4-trend models (column (6)). The samples used in columns (2)-(6) exclude owners. 
A In the establishment fixed effects model in column (4), the immigrant establishment share is a lagged dependent variable and is therefore not included. Instead we control for the 




5.1.3  Heterogeneity 
We have already established (Table 2) that the impact of manager origin varies across 
manager types. Here we investigate whether the effects are concentrated to 
firms/establishments with certain characteristics, or whether manager origin is 
important across the economy. We use the same baseline specification as before and the 
results are presented in Table B1. Given the differences between owners and others, we 
report the estimates including the owners in the estimations (column 1) as well as for 
the sample containing only the “top”, “middle” and “highest wage” managers (column 
2).  
Overall we find large, positive and significant effects of manager origin on the origin 
of new hires in establishments of all sizes, in almost all industries and in the private as 
well as in the public sector. Hence, similarity bias is a general phenomenon and not 
driven by a particular set of establishments.  
There is however substantial heterogeneity in the magnitude of the impact. Manager 
origin matters more in small firms and small establishments. This pattern is more 
pronounced when owners are included in the sample but also “top”, “middle” and 
“highest wage” managers have larger impact in the smallest size brackets.  
A second interesting result is that effects are larger in the private than in the public 
sector. Here it is important to note that recruitments in the Swedish public sector are as 
decentralized and informal as in the private sector, and that previous studies have found 
discrimination also for public sector jobs in Sweden (see Åslund and Skans, 2007). 
Hence, there are no institutional barriers preventing public sector managers from hiring 
workers that are similar to themselves. 
In terms of industry, we find that the effect is strongest in “Construction” and 
“Hotels and Restaurants”, but also in “Education” and “Health and Social Work” which 
are predominantly in the public sector. The effect is also large in “Transport” but this 
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estimate is entirely driven by owners.
22 An additional estimate which stands out is the 
manufacturing industry where origin does not seem to matter at all.  
Table B2 presents results from specifications with four different origin categories 
instead of two, again relying on the specification of column (4) in Table 2. 
Here we estimate four linear probability models, one for the probability of hiring a 
worker of each of the four origin groups. In all cases we let the reference category be 
managers of the same origin as the category defining the dependent variable. All 
regressions control for the workplace composition of employees in the four groups. The 
results show that managers of all origins are significantly more likely to hire workers 
from their own group than from any other group, relative to other managers. Cross-
effects between natives and Western immigrants are relatively small, suggesting that our 
main division of the data provides a reasonable baseline. Immigrants from Western 
countries and from Eastern Europe face rather small differences between same-group 
managers and managers of other origin. In contrast, native workers as well as Non-
Western workers have substantially lower hiring probabilities when the manager does 
not belong to the same group as themselves. Including the owners in the sample does 
not alter this pattern. 
5.2  Starting wages 
Similarity between workers and managers could affect starting wages if there are 
productivity gains from employing individuals that share the same language or business 
culture. As long as there is some rent sharing, for example due to search frictions, 
productivity gains should affect starting wages even if the gains are purely match 
specific.
23   
Table 4 summarizes the main results from traditional wage equations with the log of 
starting wages as the dependent variable and with age, education and gender as 
explanatory variables alongside establishment size, own origin and manager origin (see 
Table B3 for the full table). The richest specification in the last column controls for 2-
                                                 
22 Whereas native owners are distributed over all detailed industry codes within “Transport” almost all (93 percent) of 
the immigrant owners are found in the taxi business. (This figure is 37 percent for native owners) 
23 Previous work suggests that productivity gains do affect starting wages, see e.g. Haefke et al (2008). 
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digit occupation codes, previous wages, and time-invariant unobserved workplace 
characteristics (establishment fixed effects).  
Consistent with previous research we find that immigrant workers receive lower 
starting wages, even when controlling for detailed level of occupation and previous 
wages. However, irrespective of specification the coefficient on the interaction 
(similarity) term is small and insignificant.
24 Our results thus suggest that immigrants 
receive lower wages than natives regardless of the manager’s origin.  
This means that the similarity bias cannot be understood in a pure productivity 
context unless wages are independent of match-specific productivity. Interestingly, 
there is no additional wage premium from sharing the same country of origin as the 
manager (column 4) This variable could be viewed as an indicator for sharing the same 
language and culture, and we would therefore expect a positive estimate if productivity 
gains were an important explanation for the similarity bias in hires.  
Table 4 Starting wages 
  Dependent variable: Log monthly starting wage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
Both  immigrant  0.013 0.009 0.012 0.017 
  (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) 
Both immigrants from same country 
A  -- --  -0.017  -0.025 
 --  --  (0.025)  (0.051) 
Immigrant manager  0.012 0.008 0.008 0.011 
  (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) 
Immigrant hire  -0.060***  -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.022*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
      
Establishment  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Occupational dummies (2-digit)  -  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Wage in prev. job  -  -  -  Yes 
Observations  205,811 205,811 205,811  71311 
R
2  0.661 0.723 0.723 0.892 
Notes. *,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10/5/1 percent level respectively. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the establishment level. The model compares the starting wages of individuals 
within the same establishment controlling for age, education, gender, establishment size, worker origin, 
and manager origin. The sample consists of all workplaces in the public sector as well as a sample form 
the public sector. There is thus an underrepresentation of the private sector in these estimations. 
Estimating the effect separately by sector does not alter the main conclusions. 
A Table A1 provides a list of countries. 
 
                                                 
24 As expected, wages at entry are higher for males and are increasing in age, the level of education and in 
establishment size.  
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5.3  Separations 
Next we explore whether there are differences in employment duration depending on 
worker and manager similarity. We estimate the probability of separating using a 
dataset consisting of all workers in establishments with less than 50 employees in the 
year 2000. The model accounts for establishment fixed effects (thus implicitly also 
manager origin since the data are cross-sectional), worker origin, worker human capital 
and tenure at the establishment. The main variable of interest is the interaction term 
between the origin of the manager and the worker, which measures the effect of similar 
origin on the probability of job separation.  
To conserve space Table 5 only reports the coefficients of primary interest, i.e. 
interaction between being immigrant and having an immigrant manager and the baseline 
effect of being immigrant.
25 As shown by the first column in the table workers are less 
likely to leave when the manager has a similar origin as the worker. Evaluated at the 
sample mean, the estimate implies 22 percent higher probability of separation under 
dissimilar management.  
Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish between voluntary quits and firings. Results 
presented in the second panel of Table 5, however, show that the impact is unlikely to 
be driven by downsizing firms: restricting the sample to establishments which hired at 
least one new worker in 2001 yields very similar results.  
As in many other countries newly hired workers in Sweden are subject to a probation 
period in which they are not protected against firing at will by the employer. The 
Swedish employment protection legislation (EPL) is particularly focused on protecting 
tenured workers from layoffs (see e.g. OECD, 2004) and considers all employees with 
three years of tenure as being employed on an open-ended contract. Firms cannot lay off 
protected workers unless they are fired for cause, which is an extremely rare event due 
to very strict legal requirements (OECD, 2004), or if the firm is downsizing. In columns 
(2)-(3) we utilize this institutional feature and estimate the above model separately for 
workers who are protected and unprotected of EPL respectively (i.e. with less than or at 
                                                 
25 All control variables show the expected signs. The probability to quit decreases with age and tenure, male workers 
are more likely to quit than females. 
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least 3 years of tenure). Panel B also restricts the analysis to firms that hire after the 
separation.   
Table 5 OLS estimates of origin similarity on the probability of separation 
  Dependent variable: Pr(Quit) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Sample:  ALL  Tenure 1-2 years  Tenure > 2 years 
Panel A: All establishments      
Worker and manager  
immigrants 
-0.037* -0.104**  0.016 
(0.020) (0.044) (0.024) 
      
Worker immigrant   0.039***  0.058***  0.015** 
  (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) 
     
Manager immigrant  Captured by establishment fixed effects 
      
Observations 435,142  107,830  327,312 
R
2  0.159 0.301 0.171 
Panel B: Establishments that hired next year:   
Worker and manager  
immigrants 
-0.043** -0.103**  -0.002 
(0.021) (0.044) (0.024) 
      
Worker immigrant   0.038***  0.058***  0.013* 
  (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) 
     
Manager immigrant  Captured by establishment fixed effects 
     
Observations 380,002  90,939  289,063 
R
2  0.143 0.296 0.154 
Est. dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Controls for tenure  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Individual controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. *,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10/5/1 percent level 
respectively. Standard errors robust for serial correlation at the establishment level are shown in parentheses. The 
estimated model is a linear probability model where the dependent variable indicates whether the individual quit from 
the establishment in 2000. Panel A uses all establishments where at least one individual quit in the specific year; Panel 
B is restricted to those establishments that hired at least one worker the following year. All regressions include 
establishment fixed effects, and controls for tenure. We also include gender, education dummies, age and age
2. Note 
that the main effect of manager ethnicity is captured by the establishment fixed effects (1 year—no variation within 
establishments). 
 
These estimates reveal that the effect on separations is concentrated to workers who are 
unprotected by EPL – the point estimate for the sample of tenured workers in 
establishments that recruit (which prohibit layoffs due to downsizing) is 0.002 and 
highly insignificant despite the large number of observations. There are at least two 
possible explanations for this pattern: (i) actions by the managers are driving the 
separations (i.e. dissimilar workers are fired more often), and these actions are only 
feasible during probation; (ii) workers are more likely to quit voluntarily under a 
dissimilar manager but only when the value of the job is relatively low (i.e. giving up a 
position covered by EPL is too high a cost for not working with a non-preferred 
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manager). In any case these results are consistent with origin bias being strongest when 
the costs for dissolving the match are relatively low.
26 
5.4  Recruitments of past colleagues 
What explains the observed hiring bias? The non-existent impact of manager origin on 
starting wages is inconsistent with a pure productivity explanation unless all match-
specific rents are taken by the employer. The fact that immigrant managers tend to hire 
also immigrant workers from other parts of the world further signals that there is room 
for alternative explanations. 
Information asymmetries or networks may be important; either because managers 
find it difficult to screen workers who are dissimilar to themselves or because managers 
prefer to hire workers who are known to them from before. If immigrant managers, for 
some reason, know more immigrant workers than native managers do, similarity may 
matter for this reason alone.  
Table A4 shows the origin of all past colleagues for recently hired managers and 
workers. Immigrant managers have much more previous experiences of working with 
immigrants than native managers have. Thus, their professional networks are likely to 
involve many more immigrant workers. If these (or other similarly segregated) 
networks are important sources of information for future recruitments, then segregation 
may self-propagate. In fact, previous research (e.g. Granovetter 1995) does suggest that 
former colleagues account for a large portion of jobs found through personal contacts. 
Cingano and Rosalia (2008) also show that the employment rate of former co-workers 
significantly shortens unemployment duration for recently displaced workers. 
Our data include a long panel of individual working histories, which allows us to 
analyse how managers recruit when they hire former colleagues and estimate whether 
there is a similarity bias also in these cases. This setting isolates within-network 
differences at the same time as information asymmetries should be less of a concern 
(assuming that work-related information is revealed when working together). 
                                                 
26 Splitting the sample according to manager origin shows that this same origin bias is primarily driven by immigrant 
workers being more likely to quit under western management. 
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Our model estimates the impact of similarity on the probability of being hired by a 
former co-worker who is now manager at a new establishment. The model includes a 
fixed effect for each establishment where a manager has worked (using data up to 20 
years back) which means that we estimate the probability that each single colleague (at 
the old workplace) is recruited to the establishment where the manager currently works. 
An important feature of the model is that we, by the inclusion of the fixed effect at the 
old establishment, capture all unobserved differences that are shared between workers at 
the past workplace k at the time of past interaction (s). The sample restriction requires 
variation within each fixed effect group, which in practice means that someone (but not 
everyone) has to be hired from each past establishment, and also that there are workers 
of different origin present. The data thus include all workers at past establishments 
meeting these criteria. Formally, we estimate the following model:  
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where E is a dummy taking the value one if worker i in establishment k in year s is 
hired to establishment j in year t. W is an indicator for the origin of the worker. M is an 
indicator for an immigrant manager in establishment j at time t (who worked in 
establishment k at time s) and η  is the fixed effect for each set of previous coworkers 
(i.e. establishment*year). 
The coefficient of interest δ  measures whether similarity with the (future) manager 
increases the probability to be hired relative to other workers in the (past) 
establishment.
27 A positive estimate of δ would indicate that managers are more likely 
to bring with them workers of similar origin regardless of their baseline probability to 
follow and the composition of the network (sometimes denoted as the “inbreeding 
bias”). By contrast, if the similarity bias is driven by informal hiring and origin 
                                                 
 
27 The strategy is similar to the network studies of Bayer et al (2008) who look at whether individuals are more likely 
to work together if they live in the same block than individuals who live in the same census tract but not in the same 
block. The analogue is that we treat the previous workplace as the census tract and estimate whether a worker who 
belongs to the same ethnicity (block) is more likely to follow the manager than a worker belonging to the same 
previous establishment (tract) but not to the same ethnicity. Kramarz and Skans (2007) use a similar strategy to study 
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segregation in past networks then we expect there to be little remaining impact of origin 
similarity when accounting for the differential composition of these networks (past co-
workers).
 Hence by looking at the estimate of δ  we may be able to infer whether the 
impact of similarity with the manager remains when information asymmetries are 
substantially reduced. Among all new hires in our sample during the period 1997–2005, 
4 percent (around 39,000) had worked at the same establishment as the hiring manager 
for at least one year in the period from 1985 and up to the hire. Table 6 presents the 
estimates.  
Table 6 Fixed effects estimates of the effect of origin among former colleagues 
  Dependent variable: Pr(Follow from old workplace) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Sample:  ALL  ALL  Same skill group 
      
Worker and manager 
immigrants 
0.048*** 0.020*** 0.016** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
      
Same im. source country  -  0.098***  0.094*** 
 -  (0.015)  (0.016) 
      
Worker immigrant  -0.002  -0.002  -0.0002 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
      
Manager immigrant  Captured by fixed effects 
      
Establishment fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Est.*Education fixed effects  No  No  Yes 
Observations 1,124,036 1,124,036  518,454 
R
2  0.209 0.209 0.157 
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. *,** and *** denote statistical significance at 
10/5/1 percent level respectively. Standard errors robust for serial correlation at the establishment level 
are shown in parentheses. The sample includes all workers at establishments where at least one 
individual followed the manager to a new workplace and the model estimates the probability to be the 
“follower”.  The last column reports the within establishment and educational level effect where the 
educational level is a dummy taking the value one if the individual has high education defined as at least 
some college education. The sample includes all “followers” as well as all employees at the previous 
establishments. There are 20,013 (1,104,023) observations under immigrant (native) management, in 
1,242 (83,326) cases a previous co-worker was hired by a immigrant (native ) manager. 
 
The results suggest that workers are more likely to be hired by former colleagues, 
now managers, if they share the same broad origin. As indicated by the coefficient 
“Same immigrant source country” the effect is strongest when immigrant workers and 
managers are from the same source country, but there are also significant cross-group 
                                                                                                                                               
 
whether parents are more likely to hire their own children than other individuals who belong to the same cohort and 
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effects. One potential concern is that there can be skill differences between immigrants 
and natives in the previous workplace driving these correlations. However, it is 
reassuring to find that this result holds if we condition on human capital of the 
competitors, by including dummies for establishment-level-of-education cells in the 
regressions (column (3)). The idea is then that the later manager only considered former 
coworkers of similar skill as the one(s) actually recruited. 
6  Discussion 
We examine the impact of manager origin on the origin composition of hires. Previous 
research reveals ethnic discrimination in the hiring procedure and documents substantial 
segregation by ethnicity/origin across establishments. But empirical evidence on the 
influence of managers in explaining these phenomena is scarce. 
Our results provide strong evidence that manager origin does matter for who gets 
hired. Establishments disproportionately often hire workers who share background with 
the manager. This pattern holds in a large set of specifications, utilizing variation in 
several dimensions to control for observed and unobserved characteristics and trends, 
suggesting that we actually capture a causal effect of manager origin. These results are 
consistent with racial and ethnic hiring biases documented in single firm studies by 
Giuliano et al. (2009) and Bandiera et al. (2009). 
Although it is hard to pin down exactly why managers are more likely to hire their 
ethnic peers, our results do leave some suggestive evidence of the mechanisms at work. 
Two observations speak against the possibility that managers hire similar workers for 
efficiency reasons. The first is that immigrant managers are also more likely to hire 
immigrants of other descent than their own, whereas efficiency gains are likely to come 
with e.g. a common language. Furthermore, we find no evidence that similarity affects 
entry wages, not even when managers and hires come from the same country. Thus, a 
pure productivity story can only explain the results if the employer extracts all match-
specific productivity gains and if immigrant workers are more productive also when 
hired by immigrant managers whose language they do not speak. 
                                                                                                                                               
graduate from the same school, class, and field of study.  
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Instead we interpret our findings as favoring an explanation based on networks or 
information asymmetries. Most notably, there is no impact of ethnic similarity when 
native managers, who make up the vast majority of managers, recruit from a known 
pool of candidates (previous coworkers). This suggests that native managers are 
unbiased in a setting where information asymmetries are reduced through previous 
interaction. An alternative interpretation is that they are still biased, but their behavior is 
counteracted by immigrant workers being more inclined to follow former co-workers. 
Since this latter explanation requires that the two effects cancel out exactly, we lean 
towards the former.  
Some of our findings point in a somewhat different direction than previous studies. 
In contrast to Giuliano et al. (forthcoming), our results regarding separation rates 
indicate that at least part of the effects are driven by actions taken by the managers 
rather than the workers. It seems unlikely that Non-Western immigrants (who have the 
lowest job finding rates) would be willing to leave voluntarily due to the origin of their 
manager, especially since the separations only occur as long as workers are unsheltered 
by employment protection legislation. Another finding implicating that manager 
behavior matters is that the impact on recruitment patterns is larger when the manager 
has a higher financial stake in the outcomes, e.g. at firms in the for-profit sector and in 
owner-managed establishments. The latter finding is also in some contrast to Bandiera 
et al. (2009) who conclude that stronger financial incentives for managers reduce the 
ethnic bias in their decisions.  
These differences may partly stem from the fact that our data are drawn from a much 
more general labor market. Bad hiring decisions may carry a lower cost at the high 
turnover jobs studied previously. This difference can also be reinforced by a higher 
union coverage and more stringent employment protection legislation in Sweden than in 
the US or the UK. It is also conceivable that the uncertainty about worker productivity 
is greater at the overall labor market than e.g. in the case of fruit pickers studied in 
Bandiera et al. (2009). A conjecture consistent with the results is that similarity may be 
a pure consumption good under perfect information, but primarily a tool for reducing 
information asymmetries when uncertainty about worker productivity is high and when 
recruitments are difficult to reverse.  
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Overall, our results indicate that lack of access to “key players” at the labor market 
can explain some of the difficulties faced by workers of Non-Western descent. 
Increasing the representation of immigrants in managerial positions could therefore 
improve other immigrants’ employment prospects. This implies that promoting the 
careers of already employed immigrants may be an important complement to current 
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Appendix A, Descriptives 
Table A1 Countries and regions 
Region Countries  included 
“Natives”    
Native  0- Sweden 
Western  1-Finland  
  2-Denmark  
  3-Norway+ Iceland 
  4-GB + Ireland
5-Germany 
  6-Mediterr. Europe (Greece + Italy + Spain + Portugal + the Vatican + Monaco + 
Malta + San Marino) 
  7-Other Europe (Andorra + Belgium + France + Liechtenstein + Luxemburg + the 
Netherlands + Switzerland + Austria) 
  8-US + Canada 
“Immigrants”   
Eastern Europe  9-Bosnia-Herzegovina 
  10-Former Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia + Croatia + Macedonia + Slovenia) 
  11-Poland
  12-The Baltic states (Estonia + Latvia  + Lithuania) 
  13-Eastern Europe 1 (Rumania + The former USSR + Bulgaria + Albania) 
  14-Eastern Europe 2 (Hungary  + The former Czechoslovakia) 
Non-Western, Non-Europe  15-Mexico and Central America 
  16-Chile  
  17-Other South America (Argentina + Bolivia + Peru + Colombia + Uruguay + 
Ecuador + Guyana + Paraguay + Surinam + Venezuela) 
  18-African Horn (Ethiopia + Somalia  +Sudan + Djibouti),  
  19- North Africa + Middle East (Lebanon + Syria + Morocco + Tunisia + Egypt + 
Algeria + Israel + Palestine + Jordan + South Yemen + Yemen + the United Arab 
Emirates + Kuwait + Bahrain + Qatar + Saudi Arabia + Cyprus) 
  20- Other African (all African countries not included elsewhere)  
  21-Iran 
  22-Iraq  
  23-Turkey 
  24-East Asia (Japan + China + Korea + Hong Kong + Taiwan)  
  25-Southeast Asia (Vietnam + Thailand + the Philippines + Malaysia + Laos + 
Burma + Indonesia +  Singapore)  
  26-Other Asia (Sri Lanka + Bangladesh + India + Afghanistan + Pakistan + Brunei + 
Bhutan + Kampuchea + the Maldives + Mongolia + Nepal + Oman + Sikkim) 




Table A2 Share of total number of establishments in the economy according to 
establishment size 
Sample: ALL  Public  Private  Private  multiple
1-9  0.37 0.93 0.35 0.48 
10-49  0.50 0.98 0.27 0.60 
50-199  0.75 0.98 0.53 0.69 
200-499  0.86 0.97 0.81 0.88 
500-  0.96 0.98 0.95 0.98 
Notes: The table shows the number of establishments in our sample as a share of the total number of establishments in 
the economy. The sampling is stratified by firm size with the sampling probabilities 3%, 12%, 41%, 70% and 100% for 
the firm size intervals reported in the table respectively. The share of establishments with more than 500 employees and 
the share of public establishments should be 100%. However since the figure are based on authors calculations by 
dividing the number of establishments where we have information on wages with the total number of establishments in 
the nation wide data some of the establishments are missing for other reasons than sampling. 
 
 




Table A3 Sample statistics for robustness specifications 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 






Manager Characteristics      
Owner 0.09  -  0.00  0.02 
Top  Manager  0.14 0.15 0.20 0.16 
Middle  Manager  0.24 0.26 0.38 0.21 
Highest  wage  0.53 0.58 0.41 0.61 
      






Establishment characteristics      
Establishment size  24.3 25.6 24.6 25.5 











      
Industry      
Agriculture, hunting and forestry  2.1 0.9 1.1 0.3 
Fishing  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mining and quarrying  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Manufacturing  3.1 2.9 5.1 1.3 
Electricity, gas and water supply  0.6  0.7  0.4  0.0 
Construction  3.9 3.0 4.5 0.6 
Wholesale and retail sale  14.2  13.9  39.7  18.0 
Hotels and restaurants  3.0  1.6  3.0  2.9 
Transport, storage and communication  5.3  4.5  5.1  1.7 
Financial intermediation  3.5  3.8  16.4  2.0 
Real Estate, renting and business activities  6.7  6.4  12.2  4.3 
Public adm. and defense  4.8  5.3  -  4.5 
Education 17.1  18.6  3.0  13.3 
Health and Social work  28.0  31.6  5.8  46.1 
Other community, social and personal 
service activities 
6.7 6.9 3.8 5.1 
Observations 843,085  766,983  155,085  5,504 
Notes: Column (i) reports sample characteristics for the overall sample of hires whereas column (2), (3) and (4) shows 
the characteristics for the samples used in the robustness specifications reported in Table 3 in the main text. The level 
of observation is the individual and hence the table shows the fraction of new hires in each category. The four samples 




Table A4 Share of immigrant co-workers in past five years (for newly hired managers 
and individuals in 2005) 

















Notes: The figures in the table were obtained by tracking the previous establishments of all newly hired workers and 




Appendix B, Additional results 
Table B1 Effects of manager origin on hires and quits in various subsamples 
  Equation 1 
 ALL  No  owners 
 
estimate se estimate se 
Main effect  0.123*** 0.051***  0.005
Establishment size      
2-9  0.244*** 0.008 0.078*** 0.015 
10-19  0.121*** 0.008 0.048*** 0.010 
20-29  0.068*** 0.010 0.056*** 0.012 
30-39  0.049*** 0.013 0.032*** 0.012 
40-49  0.053*** 0.013 0.047*** 0.013 
      
Sector      
Public  0.038*** 0.007 0.038*** 0.007 
Private – single establishment firm  0.218***  0.013 0.038 0.034 
Private – multiple establishment firm  0.056*** 0.013 0.056*** 0.013 
      
Firm size      
Private – firm with less than 10 workers  0.308*** 0.012 0.183*** 0.050 
Private – firm with 10-49 workers  0.194*** 0.013 0.121*** 0.032 
Private – firm with 50-99 workers  0.071 0.047 0.080 0.048 
Private – firm with 100+ workers  0.046*** 0.012 0.050*** 0.013 
      
Industry
(1)      
Agriculture, hunting and forestry  0.212***  0.059 0.101 0.066 
Manufacturing 0.038  0.046 -0.008 0.051 
Construction  0.279*** 0.042 0.161*** 0.055 
Wholesale and retail sale  0.157***  0.013  0.048***  0.012 
Hotels and restaurants  0.209***  0.012  0.113***  0.028 
Transport, storage and communication  0.240***  0.017 0.026 0.023 
Financial intermediation  0.018 0.018 0.020 0.017 
Real Estate, renting and business activities  0.163***  0.020  0.045*  0.026 
Compulsory social security  0.073***  0.027  0.075**  0.027 
Education 0.072***  0.016 0.075*** 0.016 
Health and Social work  0.042***  0.008  0.037***  0.008 
Other community, social and personal services   0.085***  0.019  0.042**  0.020 
      
Municipality-Industry-Year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: *,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10/5/1 percent level respectively. Standard errors 
robust for serial correlation at the establishment level are shown in parentheses. The table reports results 
from six integrated regressions (per outcome). Columns (1) and (2) report the heterogeneous effects with 
and without owners respectively. All regressions control for the share of immigrants at the establishment, 
establishment size dummies of ten employee intervals as well as dummies for municipality-industry-year.   





Table B2 OLS estimates disaggregated by origin groups (No owners included) 
  Hire ethnicity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 






Manager origin      
Native -  -0.013***  -0.023***  -0.056*** 
  -  (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) 
Western countries  -0.020*** - -0.021***  -0.050*** 
 (0.004)  -  (0.005)  (0.008) 
Eastern Europe  -0.044***  -0.008*  -  -0.039*** 
 (0.008)  (0.004)  -  (0.010) 
Non-W., Non-Europe  -0.068***  -0.008  -0.016**  - 
  (0.009) (0.003) (0.006)  - 
      
Firm size dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Mun-Ind-Year  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  766,983 766,983 766,983 766,983 
R
2  0.195 0.157 0.158 0.171 
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. *,** and *** denote statistical significance at 10/5/1 percent level 
respectively. Standard errors robust for serial correlation at the establishment level are shown in parentheses. The 
estimated model is a linear probability model where the dependent variable indicates whether the new hire belongs to 
each of the groups in column (1)-(4). Industry codes are at the 5-digit establishment level. The sample consists of 
establishments with less than 50 employees and all regressions include controls for establishment size of ten employee 










Table B3 Starting wage effects of origin similarity between hire and manager’s ethnicity 
 Dependent  variable: Log monthly wage 
 (1)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
        
Both immigrant  0.013  0.009  0.012  0.017 
 (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.019) 
Both same immigrant country  -  -  -0.017  -0.023 
 -  -  (0.025)  (0.051) 
Immigrant manager  0.012 0.008 0.008 0.011 
 (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.010) 
Immigrant hire  -0.060***  -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.022*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Individual characteristics      
Age 0.019***  0.016***  0.016***  0.009*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age
2  -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Female -0.045***  -0.029***  -0.030***  -0.013*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Educational level      
Compulsory long  0.053***  0.037***  0.037***  0.004 
 (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004) 
Secondary short  0.063***  0.048***  0.048***  0.013*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Secondary long  0.092***  0.062***  0.062***  0.023*** 
 (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
University short  0.154***  0.088***  0.088***  0.042*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004) 
University long  0.238***  0.128*** 0.128*** 0.058*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
PhD 0.392***  0.257***  0.257***  0.106*** 
 (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.018) 
Establishment size      
10-19 employees  0.020***  0.020***  0.020***  0.006 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005) 
20-29 employees  0.037***  0.038***  0.038***  0.013** 
 (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.006) 
30-39 employees  0.056***  0.056***  0.056***  0.017*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
40-49 employees  0.074***  0.075***  0.075***  0.023*** 
 (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.007) 
        
Establishment  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Occupational dummies (2-digit)  -  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Wage in prev. job  -  -  -  Yes 
Observations 205,811  205,811  205,811  71,311 
R
2 0.661  0.723  0.723  0.892 
Notes:  see Table 4 
 
 
 